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The Citizen in Uniform:
Reform and its Critics in the Bundeswehr
by Donald Abenheim
Naval Postgraduate School , Monterey CA
The foundation of the West German armed forces in 1955-56
was without precedent. Never before in German history had a
democracy created its own army; nor had there been 'an armed force
within a German democracy based upon conscription and integrated
in a supranational alliance. Despite the innovations of the
Bundeswehr, the men who founded the West German military in the
1950s cast their glance not forward to a nuclear-armed and
missile-laden world of the superpowers, but backward to the
political misfortunes of German liberalism, social democracy, and
the military in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If
one wants to understand the West German soldier as he sees
himself, one must begin with the burden of the past on the
professional German soldier. Foreign observers of the West German
military often overlook this aspect in their eagerness to discuss
such issues as NATO strategy, operations, defense budgets, and
procurement. The relationship between the West German soldier
and Germany's military past stood foremost among the obstacles
facing the organizers of the new army. Neither questions of
nuclear strategy nor issues of conventional military doctrine
aroused nearly as much political concern among West Germans as
the perennial problem of the soldier in the state or, as one
expert described it in 1959, "the danger to freedom from its
defenders." Germany's defeat in two world war and the role of
professional soldiers in the Weimar Republic and Third Reich made
the step towards a West German contribution to Atlantic defense a
bold and difficult one. The arming of the Federal Republic could
only occur with the reform of the future soldier's political
self-image and his position in state and society. In effect, the
creators of the new army had to reconstruct from the nation's
i
military past those traditions and symbols not fully destroyed by
the Nazis; at the same time, they had to fashion new institutions
and practices that would assure the loyalty of the new army to
the Bonn democracy. The promise of reform ran into formidable
political and social obstacles that have made the Bundeswehr a
source of constant debate during its more than three decades. The
present essay identifies some key episodes from this exchange to
illustrate the political, social, ethical, and moral aspects of
the West German soldier generally unknown or misunderstood by
Americans. It argues for the serious and genuine intent of the
military reformers, whose relative success in the face of great
difficulty has distinguished the history of the Bundeswehr.
* * * *
The West German military reform is best known for its two
particular ideas: the "citizen in uniform" ( Staatsbuerger in
Uniform ) and Innere Fuehrung , a concept that defies easy
translation. Perhaps the phrase "leadership and participation"
best conveys what the Bundeswehr means by Innere Fuehrung . On the
Dne hand, Innere Fuehrung represents a conscious attempt to
foster what the leadership of the Bundeswehr describes as a
'German military tradition of training for initiative" in
c ....
command. On the other hand, the ideal of participation insures
that the citizens in uniform take part in the democratic way of
Life of the Federal Republic even while in military service.
But this definition is only a beginning and requires an
historical explanation of military reform in the West German
army. The long and at times bitter debate about the meaning of
Innere Fuehrung might serve as the story of the political
consolidation of the Bundeswehr itself. A modest pamphlet given
out to English-speaking members of the seminars held at the
Center for Innere Fuehrung in Koblenz--the site of an on-going
exchange on the political, social, and ethical aspects of the
military—offers a convenient point of departure for a better
understanding of the ideal of the "citizen in uniform." The
document enumerates the ten "Principles of Innere Fuehrung"
(described in English as "Principles on Leadership and Civic
Education" ) . The first of these principles includes the statement
that "the soldier is to be a citizen in uniform who consciously
makes use of his rights," who "with equal consciousness" fulfills
the duties linked to these rights. Innere Fuehrung aims to
balance "the citizen's demand for freedom in a liberal democracy
with the soldier's duties in an organization devoted to the
highest degree of military efficiency." In other words, the West
German citizen in uniform must defend his freedoms as a "citizen
in arms," recognizing his duty to join in the common defense.
This paradigm is to be found in the military ideas of German
liberalism and social democracy of the nineteenth century, in the
ideals of the French Revolution, and in Machiavelli ' s concept for
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a Florentine militia based upon the army of Republican Rome.
While in uniform, the West German citizen is also to enjoy as
many of his civil rights as possible: "Military service shall not
lead to any basic break with the soldier's life as a citizen." If
he experiences his constitutional rights while in uniform, the
"citizen in uniform" will possess the conviction to defend them
with his life. This fundamental idea has antecedents in the era
of Prussian reform in the early nineteenth century, when the men
who sought to strengthen Prussia after its defeat at the hands of
Napoleon reformed the social structure of the Prussian army. The
founders of the West German military wanted to banish the
barracks-square drill and spit and polish of the old armies,
which had long been the object of protest from liberal, middle
class, and socialist forces. The second of the ten principles
insists that the soldier of the Bundeswehr is "to realize and
accept that political leadership prevails over military
leadership.
"
The additional paragraphs include statements about the
mutual loyalty between state and the soldier; the duty of
military superiors to take account of the needs of their
subordinates; the imperative to lead subordinates according to
the principles of "mission-type orders"; and the mandate that
soldiers "shall take over and pass on proved soldier-like virtues
and experiences .
"
y Such phrases initially leave a favorable
Impression upon the reader; there is no echo here of the cadence
Df marching boots on the barracks square or visions of spit and
polished men in blue tunics and spiked helmets. But on further
reflection these winged-words suggest a number of questions. In
the German past and present is there not a certain tension in
such terms as "citizen in uniform," "the needs of subordinates,"
mission-type orders," "military efficiency," and the passing on
bf "soldier-like virtues and experiences." By what means could
soldiers trained in the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht adapt the new
military to an altered political setting of a liberal democracy?
How does one insure that "political leadership" shall prevail
bver "military leadership," given the nature of war and the
conflict between the civil and military spheres of statecraft? By
what means does one balance the imperative to uphold the
citizen's rights against the requirements of military efficiency?
The historical record of the attempts by liberal forces to
subject the military to civilian control from the mid-19th
century to the early 20th century did not augur well for the
success of military reform. The role of the professional soldier
in the crimes of National Socialism made the problem greater
still.
The question of the soldier and the state confronted West
Germans from the moment of the army's conception at the height of
the Cold War. Above all else, the Federal Republic had to
reconcile the professional military with social groups whose
earlier demands for liberty, equality, and fraternity took them
to the barricades, where they were confronted with soldiers,
bayonets, and cannon. This essay describes two important episodes
in this story: the initial design of the reforms in the early and
mid-1950s and the subsequent controversy about military reform in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although these episodes offer
somewhat less than the complete history of the "citizen in
uniform, " they will introduce the American reader to the
complexities of the political and ethical development of the West
German military. The manner in which West Germans have answered
the question of the soldier and the state over the past three
decades provides important insights into the ideal of "citizen in
uniform," the principles of Innere Fuehrung, and the self-image
of soldier in West Germany.
* * * *
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 came a little
more than five years after the total defeat of Nazi Germany. The
beginning of a shooting war in Asia, only thirteen months after
the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, plunged Europe
into a "great fear" about coming Soviet aggression. The dramatic
heightening of the Cold War led the Western allies to accelerate
the arming of the new Federal Republic, a move which had been
discussed in semi-secrecy since the experience of the Berlin
Blockade. Konrad Adenauer and his military advisors responded
to the toscin of the Allied High Commissioners. The Germans
prepared first for a West German force associated with NATO, then
shifted their plans to a German contingent in a European army.
Only after August 1954 did work at last begin on the military
force that was finally christened "Bundeswehr" in April 1956, a
few months after its soldiers had first shouldered their weapons.
The West Germans leaders felt the imperative to break with
Germany's militaristic and outdated past, much as the advocates
of reform in Prussia had tried to do after 1806, and as the
Weimar Republic had more fatefully failed to do with the
Reichswehr of the 1920s. The political and social conditions of
the 1950s, however, were considerably more complex.
No one in authority wanted to revive the Wehrmacht as it had
existed before 1945. The close identification of the military
with the Nazi past, the traumatic effect on professional soldiers
of the Twentieth of July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life (organized
in large part by dissident officers), and the popular disgust
with all things military in the wake of defeat prevented
Adenauer's government from simply restoring traditional military
institutions. The chancellor and his military advisors had to
take stock of earlier civil-military problems and integrate the
new army into the transformed setting of a nascent pluralistic
democracy. Added to such political and intellectual challenges
were the realities of postwar life that worked against the arming
of the Federal Republic: cities filled with rubble; the leaders
of the Wehrmacht on trial as criminals, with thousands of former
officers imprisoned in East and West; and the popular response to
Adenauer's call to arms of "count me out." For the majority of
West Germans, the sudden shift from total disarmament to
rearmament, from defeated country to ally of the West, came too
soon and too fast. With these obstacles before them, Adenauer and
his advisors laid plans for the new army in the autumn of 1950.
Adenauer summoned a handful of former Wehrmacht officers to
draft a secret planning document for the new armed forces that
would simultaneously be the basis for further negotiations with
the Allies. The group—including Hans Speidel, Adolf Heusinger,
Friedrich Ruge, Johann Adolf Count von Kielmansegg, and Wolf
Count von Baudissin—met in the Abbey Himmerod in the Eifel
mountains during the first days of October. Described years later
by Adenauer's first security advisor as the "Magna Carta of the
Bundeswehr," the Himmerod Memorandum contained the chief
political, strategical, operational, and ethical issues
confronting a future West German contingent for Western
defense.
The final draft of the meeting, prepared by Kielmansegg,
called for an "end to the defamation of the professional soldier"
and a "declaration of honor" for the German soldier to be given
by prominent figures in the Western alliance and the West German
12government. Professional German soldiers were divided in their
support for Adenauer's policy. Many former leading officers,
freshly released from their jail cells, spoke out against the
arming of the Federal Republic. These demands by the Himmerod
group were to refute such criticism. In addressing the "inner
structure" of the new force, that is, the sum of political,
social, and ethical institutions and practices that assure the
morale of an army in peace and war, the authors wanted to follow
a new path. The group at Himmerod recognized that the profoundly
altered conditions of postwar Europe required the creation of
'something fundamentally new, without any borrowings from the
orms of the old armed forces." The officers insisted that the
lew army must avoid becoming a "state within a state" and it must
iully embrace the democratic principles of the Federal
Republic. The new army should also help to integrate young
Germans into a united Europe. The West German government would
lave to select its key military personnel with great care to
exclude the anti-democratically minded. The principles of this
new beginning" were to be set down at the outset and adhered to
:or the duration.
The memorandum contained many of the ideas that later were
realized in the concept of Innere Fuehrung. Here also appeared
for the first time in the pre-history of the Bundeswehr what
advocates of reform later described as the "citizen in uniform,
"
a term that symbolized the willingness of the Himmerod group to
refashion the image of the German soldier. But the document
included other statements that betrayed uncertainties about the
means of reaching the goal of reform and suggested that the path
to reform would not be an easy one. The West German contribution
to European defense, in the view of the Himmerod group, must find
a compromise between the need for "a new meaning" in military
life and "less rigid forms and rituals," while still respecting
peoples' wishes for a more traditional image of the soldier and
the state. Elsewhere the authors spoke of the need to launch a
wide-spread propaganda campaign to strengthen the "will to arms"
and of the need to suppress the opponents of the Bonn democracy.
The tone of these demands seemed very much like an ultimatum to
Adenauer--talk of propaganda and suppressing opponents recalled
the recent past.
The proposals at Himmerod about the political and ethical
aspects of the future soldier contained obvious contradictions.
Granted the conditions of the new beginning, one could hardly
have expected the men at Himmerod to have worked out the full
details of reform of the German soldier in society after only a
few days. Indeed, aside from the realization that a fairly
drastic reform was necessary, they had very little idea of how to
integrate the new soldier into the Bonn democracy. Nor did they
seem to know how to resolve the perennial conflict between the
professional soldier and parliamentary government in German life.
These tasks remained to be done over the course of the 1950s and
1960s. That such contradictions existed in the document should
not seem surprising, when one considers that the authors of inner
structure section of the document included, among others, General
Hermann Foertsch and Major Count Wolf von Baudissin. Foertsch
(whose brother would become Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr) had
been closely associated with the ideological training of the
Wehrmacht; he later served in the brutal campaigns in the
Balkans. In contrast, Baudissin quickly became known over the
next ten years as an outspoken advocate of reform in the
Bundeswehr. Despite its contradictions, however, the Himmerod
document marked the beginning of the planning for reform in the
Bundeswehr and the birth of the "citizen in uniform."
* * * *
10
The debate about the spirit of the future soldier spread
steadily in West German political circles during the years of
^reparation for the European army, much as the divergent opinion
ibout the NATO Intermediate Force Deployments were to do some
:hree decades later. Until August 1954, the planning for reform
proceeded within the framework of the European Defense Community
(EDC), the joint armed forces of France, the BENELUX, Italy, and
Vest Germany that were to be integrated into NATO. The planning
Eor the West German contribution took place in Bonn and Paris
inder Theodor Blank, a former reserve officer, trade unionist,
and parliamentarian, whom Adenauer chose to oversee what became
lis shadow defense ministry—the Amt Blank. By its very nature,
bhe program of military reform in the Adenauer government was a
liberal "anti-traditional concept" intended to banish from the
future army authoritarian, anti-democratic, and militarist
practices of the past. The promise of reform signified Adenauer's
effort to win the cooperation of those in society who distrusted
Dr opposed the military.
* * * *
The effort to transform this general desire for reform into
specific measures had gotten under way in early 1951 with the
arrival of Count Baudissin in the Amt Blank. Baudissin's planning
for future military legislation and the inner structure of the
forces included meetings and seminars with a wide variety of
political and social organizations. Although others worked on the
reforms—including such parliamentarians as Fritz Erler and
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Richard Jaeger, jurists like Eberhard Barth and such former
officers as Kielmansegg, Ulrich De Maiziere and Heinz Karst
—
Baudissin became the best known public spokesman on the political
and moral aspects of arming the Federal Republic, the individual
the average West German most clearly identified with the ideal of
the "citizen in uniform. " Baudissin gave hundreds of talks
throughout West Germany about a future soldier who would serve
out of a sense of democratic conviction and who would experience
his civil rights while in uniform. The West German soldier was to
be freed from the senseless spit and polish and mindless heel-
clicking of the past. Baudissin hoped that the new soldier of the
Federal Republic would spread a democratic ethos through the
ranks of a conscription army, much as the Prussian military
reformers had tried to do a century and a half earlier. This
ideal of a democratic avant-garde, however, was received
skeptically by those unwilling to allow the military an elite
role in West German society.
The concept of the "citizen in uniform" provoked opposition
among those reluctant to admit the political failings of the
professional military in the twentieth century and its
culpability under National Socialism. Baudissin 's opponents
responded that the German soldier had held most of the world at
bay for nearly ten years during two world wars. In view of this
fighting power, the critics argued, one need change neither the
soldier's concept of discipline and obedience nor his ethical
outlook. The profession of soldiering, in the view of Baudissin'
s
critics, was sui generis , unchanging in its basic nature and thus
12
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not in need of reform. But these voices in favor of "authentic
soldierhood" and a "warrior caste" were fairly isolated; they
found little following among the broad mass of West Germans in
the 1950s. Such opposition came generally from the ranks of the
veterans organizations, whose political importance in the Bonn
democracy never approached the influence wielded by similar
organizations in the Weimar Republic. The anger of the veterans,
however, was really the least of Baudissin's problems.
The reform effort in the years before 1955-56 existed in
staff planning papers and on green felt conference tables in Bonn
and Paris. The planners drafted proposals for the European army
negotiations and the military amendments to the West German Basic
Law. This enterprise was carried out under conditions of
political uncertainty, scarce resources, and international
I Q
frictions. Until 1955, the planners had no firm idea whether
the new army would ever get off the ground; the diplomatic
ramifications and domestic political opposition seemed far too
great. As time passed, the planning for reform, as with so many
other strategical, operational, and logistical aspects of the new
army, fell victim to too little time, limited political
authority, and official confusion. Since West Germany was not yet
a sovereign country, Adenauer had to keep military planning under
very tight control. He especially wanted to avoid the appearance
of the secret rearmament of the "black Reichswehr" in the Weimar
Republic. He forbade his military staff from taking any concrete
steps until the allies gave their assent. Vagueness about the
specifics of reform and intense bureaucratic disputes about the
13
procedures to be followed further undermined the work of the
20planners, who fell into episodes of bureaucratic squabbling.
This friction strengthened the hand of those who saw little need
to alter the image and outlook of the future German soldier.
These difficulties multiplied when the French National Assembly
refused to consider the EDC treaty on 30 August 1954, thus
killing off the supra-national army and making a national West
German army a necessity. Under pressure from the Americans and
British, the planners had to tear up their previous work and
draft new proposals, for a West German force that was to be
integrated into NATO.
* * * *
The military reform remained the centerpiece of public
interest as West Germans addressed the spirit and civilian
control of the new army in parliament during 1955-56. The
leading political parties all agreed that the arming of the
Federal Republic could only take place with legislative
assurances of democratic control of the military. Although
Socialists and Christian Democrats in parliament disagreed
intensely over the details of Western integration of the Federal
Republic into Atlantic defense, a broad consensus existed among
the parties on the need to subordinate the military to the
control of the legislative and executive branches. As the concept
of reform emerged during the great debate in parliament of 1955-
56 on the military legislation, the German soldier was supposed
to re-examine all military traditions, to retain those of value,
14
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and to discard the rest. The changing nature of warfare in the
mid-1950s, with its emphasis on mechanization, small unit
engagements, the emerging role of nuclear weapons, and the
importance of ideology, underscored the need for a soldier
capable of operational initiative and ideological conviction. The
answer to this stipulation was the "citizen in uniform, " whose
democratic beliefs and functional military skills would allow him
9 ~\to survive on the modern battlefield. The blind obedience and
barracks-square drill depicted in Hans Helmmuth Kirst's popular
novel, 08/15 , were to be a thing of the past. Political
education of the future soldier would assume equal status with
military training, for the ideas of Innere Fuehrung addressed the
ideological aspects of the Cold War no less than the integration
9 S
of the soldier into society.
Parliament, working with the planners in the Amt Blank,
institutionalized a number of the key reforms in the military
9 fi
amendments to the Basic Law of 1955/7. The legislation was to
make the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" into the law of the
land; in fact the laws best exemplify the principles of Innere
Fuehrung. The authors of the legislation stipulated that the
Minister of Defense would be the supreme commander of the
military in peacetime, thus assuring the primacy of politics over
purely military concerns. The Soldier's Law guaranteed the basic
rights of the West German soldier as never before, at the same
time setting certain limits on the soldier's constitutional
rights because of the needs of defense. The Soldier's Law also
required professional soldiers to swear an oath to defend the
15
republic, while draftees only need make a "ceremonial
obligation." The authors of the laws gave the Defense Committee
of the Bundestag special investigative powers and established the
post of parliamentary defense commissioner ( Wehrbeauftragter ) to
oversee the implementation of Innere Fuehrung in the ranks.
Soldiers could turn to the commissioner (based on a Swedish
institution) with their complaints, which would then be
investigated by the legislative branch.
The laws provided for the establishment of a personnel
screening committee as an independent organ of government. The
committee was to select future colonels and generals whose
political attitude and experience would be acceptable to the Bonn
democracy. The personnel screening committee eventually proved to
be an exceptionally important component in the reform of the
Bundeswehr. Its twenty or so members, some identified with the
anti-Nazi resistance, were to decide in secret on the
qualifications of the top officers. The committee not only opened
the way for the first generation of senior Bundeswehr officers,
but also blocked those whose past attitude and behavior might
have disgraced the new army. The Bundeswehr was probably unique
in its strict personnel policies, unlike other leading
professions that suffered embarrassing revelations about the Nazi
past of certain figures.
Yet another of the reforms of 1955/6—the creation of the
Armed Forces Administration ( Bundeswehrverwaltung ) --separated
many of the administrative functions of the military forces from
the combat branches and placed them in civilian hands. Issues of
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pay, clothing, equipment, and liaison with the local civilian
government were now to be done by some 170,000 civilian employees
of the military. This division of responsibilities reflected a
conscious attempt to enforce civilian control upon the new army
by taking personnel, materiel, and money out of the hands of men
in uniform. The soundness of the idea behind this decision
notwithstanding, certain German civilians of the time found it
difficult to adapt Anglo-Saxon ideas of "civilian control of the
military" without going all the way to zivile Kontrolle , where
career civil servants were to give all the orders to professional
soldiers. Although this reform exacerbated the bureaucratic
struggles that dogged the Bundeswehr during much of its first two
decades, the framers of the military laws saw the institution of
a civilian military administration as a necessary assurance of a
balanced civil-military relationship.
The further course of the military legislation of the mid-
1950s shaped the character of the new army. After much vocal
opposition led by the SPD, parliament adopted conscription for
the Bundeswehr, making the new army the first to be based on the
Wehrpf licht in a German democracy. The advent of the defense
legislation marked a victory for military reform, but one which
would remain hollow unless the soldiers themselves would accept
the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" in the ranks.
* * * *
The military reforms proved to be a success in the Federal
Republic after a period of consolidation that lasted from the
17
mid-1950s to the early 1970s. The triumph of reform in the
Bundeswehr, however, came about at a price. Given the political
and ethical burdens of the birth of the Bundeswehr, the details
of reform were often controversial among professional soldiers.
Critics of Innere Fuehrung claimed that the reforms hampered
their ability to carry out their mission on the battlefield and
symbolized the "institutionalized mistrust" of West German
97.
society regarding the army. Such resistance, sub rosa in the
first years of the Bundeswehr, asserted itself openly during a
brief period of conflict about military reform and West German
society during 1967-1971. It would be a mistake to see this
opposition to reform as a militarist, anti-democratic revival of
the professional military caste that had existed up until the
collapse of the Third Reich. The criticism of reform was a
natural and unavoidable consequence of what one West German
general (himself a product of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht)
described as the "need to digest all the new things, from
op
fighting an atomic war to Innere Fuehrung." The West German
soldier had to adapt earlier ideas, practices, and customs to a
variety of new political, strategical, and ethical circumstances.
This radical change would have vexed professional soldiers with a
far happier past than that of the Germans.
Observers of the ethical debates within the Bundeswehr,
anxious about a militarist revival, began after 1951 to describe
soldiers of the future West German military as either
"reformists" or "traditionalists." Even as the first soldiers
were mustered into the military in 1956, the new Chief of Staff,
18
General Adolf Heusinger, worried aloud that with the rapid tempo
of arming the Federal Republic the new army would become a
battleground between men adhering to traditional ideas and the
advocates of reform. The apparent cleavage in the officer
corps, much commented upon in the press in the 1950s and 1960s,
never grew as serious as the political divisions between
professional officers in Weimar Republic or in the Third Reich.
From the perspective of the late nineteen eighties, it seems
fairly plain that this typology of two camps in the officer corps
was somewhat exaggerated. The so-called "traditionalists" never
dreamed of political opposition to the democratic governmenr; no
general emerged in the nineteen fifties to lead a putsch in Bonn.
But there was much debate among professional soldiers about "the
purpose of soldierly existence" in an age of multinational
alliances, nuclear weapons, and pluralistic society. The effort
to adapt prevailing images of the German soldier to an altered
political world was accompanied by much debate and friction about
nearly all aspects of the new army. Adherents of traditional
ideas about the image of war and the soldier often clashed with
proponents of a new image of a war of high technology. German
soldiers debated whether weapons of mass destruction were to play
a more prominent role in the future army than the maneuver
warfare of Moltke, Schlieffen, and Guderian.
The resistance to reform was greatly aided by the
international political conditions surrounding the activation of
the Bundeswehr in the mid-1950s. The West German military,
conceived in the wake of the the outbreak of the Korean War, was
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finally activated in 1955-56 amid yet another crisis associated
with the advent of a kind of detente in Europe and hints of an
Anglo-American withdrawal from the continent. The possibility in
1955 that the Western allies might redraw the map of Europe at
the expense of West Germany threatened the efficacy of Adenauer's
policy of western integration of the Federal Republic. In view
of this second crisis, Adenauer needed soldiers right away; he
threw out previous plans for the phased activation of the new
army over six years. His decision to rush ahead at breakneck
speed handicapped the inner consolidation of the Bundeswehr and
greatly compromised the effort to make the reforms into a
smoothly functioning reality. There followed a series of
organizational and structural scandals that seemed to indicate to
critics of the Bundeswehr in the late 1950s that the traditional
organizational genius of the German general staff had vanished.
The NATO allies worried that the West German military, crippled
by its birth pains, would fail on the battlefield. The political
imperative to get troop units formed rapidly collided with
shortages of company grade officers and NCOs as well as a lack of
uniforms, barracks, and training facilities. There were also some
glaring problems with modern weapons. The combination of these
difficulties forced Blank to resign; his successor was Franz-
Josef Strauss.
In a ministerial report commenting on the status of Innere
Fuehrung in late 1956, Baudissin warned that neither the material
nor personnel basis for the reforms existed among the troops.
Quarters, clothing, pay, and benefits were so inadequate that the
20
principles of Innere Fuehrung did not seem credible to the
troops. Baudissin concluded that Innere Fuehrung had not kept
pace with other aspects of rearmament; neither officers nor men
fully grasped the tasks of the reforms. In response, troop
instructors schooled in the Wehrmacht resurrected the spit and
polish and barracks-square drill of the 1936 regulations. This
development, Baudissin observed, signified a growing movement in
favor of restoration within the ranks. Certain veterans of the
Reichswehr and Wehrmacht dismissed the reforms as militarily
unnecessary, reducing the combat power of the armed forces, and
intellectually beyond the level of most recruits. Critics of
Baudissin and the reforms argued that the combat effectiveness of
the Wehrmacht against the Red Army justified harsh military
training and iron discipline in the ranks of the Bundeswehr.
Another aspect of the build-up of the Bundeswehr complicated
matters even further. Many West Germans soldiers were trained by
American, French, and British instructors, whose adherence to
traditional military customs and discipline was complete; in
certain cases, the contact between German and NATO ally
reimported into West Germany the harsh discipline that the
reforms sought to banish.
The conditions described in Baudissin 's report
notwithstanding, the most important period of resistance and
debate about Innere Fuehrung came not in the first years of the
new army, but in the late 1960s. While the Bundeswehr remained a
subject of controversy for much of the late 1950s and 1960s, the
conjuncture of political and social upheaval from 1966 to 1969
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brought strikingly into the open old civil-military tensions
among certain professional soldiers about the ideal of the
"citizen in uniform." This period of intense conflict about
military reform marked the true end of the build-up of the
Bundeswehr and the climax in the development of the "citizen in
uniform." This era also offers the clearest opportunity to
understand the internal military challenge to Innere Fuehrung.
One must proceed from Baudissin's report of late 1956 to the
political turbulence surrounding the end of the Adenauer era and
the beginning of the Social Liberal coalition.
* * * *
In the years after 1966 the founding fathers of the Bonn
republic left the national scene; the political and economic calm
of West German life gave way to a period of upheaval and dissent
during 1967-1972. The effects of this era remain present in the
West German society of the 1980s. The combination of detente
between the great powers, economic stagnation, and the rise of
political radicalism on the right and left undermined the tenets
of political life in the Federal Republic. New voices in West
German politics took to the streets. Such organizations as
Socialist Students Association and the Extraparliamentary
Opposition opposed the Cold War compromise about international
relations, politics, and society upon which the founding fathers
had built the young republic. The spirit of iconoclasm against
all traditions, the opposition against "the mustiness of a
thousand years," challenged the Bundeswehr as it did few other
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institutions of West German life. Critics of state and society
assaulted the army as being the authoritarian embodiment of all
they deplored in West Germany. The number of men refusing
military service rose quickly; NCOs and company grade officers
found ever greater resistance to their orders among the
draftees. Such tensions exacerbated old disagreements about the
efficacy of military reform, moving critics of Innere Fuehrung to
new boldness in questioning the "citizen in uniform" as a "taboo"
-> Q
of West German military life.
Before describing the shape of this debate about the
military reform, one should say that the themes of the "citizen
in uniform" and Innere Fuehrung stood in the shadow of greater
questions of the Federal Republic of the late nineteen sixties:
the Grand Coalition, the student unrest, the anti-Vietnam
protest, and the beginnings of Ostpolitik. The last great debate
about the meaning of Innere Fuehrung was very much an internal
problem of the Bundeswehr, but it took place simultaneously with
these other events in the Federal Republic. This phase of intense
criticism about the development of Innere Fuehrung reflected the
internal difficulties of a segment of the officer corps.
Nonetheless, an analysis of the intensity of their criticism and
the way in which it was offered contributes to a fuller
understanding of military reform in the Federal Republic.
Faced with growing political and social protest among young
West Germans during 1967-69, a group of officers in the
leadership of the German Army, anxious about the efficiency of
their forces on the battlefield, argued that the military had to
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respond to the political and social challenges to their
19profession. The "counter-reformation" among the leaders of the
army came out into the open during the spring of 1969. In mid-
March, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General Hans-
Hellmuth Grashey assaulted the institutions of reform in a speech
in Hamburg. Speaking before a group of general staff officers
at the Command and Staff College, Grashey criticized the most
recent report to the Bundestag by the parliamentary commissioner.
Grashey described the ills of the Bundeswehr as stemming from
three aspects of the reforms: the parliamentary commissioner, the
oversized civilian military administration, and the concept of
Innere Fuehrung itself. His most disturbing assertion was that
the program of military reform had been little other than a
"mask." In reality, Innere Fuehrung stood for nothing more than
the care which a military superior showed towards his
subordinates. Such customs had always been in the German
military, but the founders of the new army had sold the reforms
as new in order to win the support of the Socialists for
rearmament. Now that political opposition to the military was on
the rise, one could take the mask from one's face and say that
Innere Fuehrung had always existed. This assertion about the
reforms had been made thousands of times in officers clubs since
the early 1950s, but Grashey 's description of Innere Fuehrung
failed to recognize that the "citizen in uniform" represented an
innovation in German history. The reforms assured the civil
rights of soldier and the say of parliament in the forces as
never before. Once fragments of the speech became public, the
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words of the Vice Chief of Staff seemed to indicate that the
military had duped parliament and was awaiting the return to pre-
democratic military traditions.
Shortly after the Grashey speech, Chancellor Kurt-Georg
Kiesinger made headlines with his own comments on military
reform. Before a group of military men in Godesberg in June
1969 , he called Innere Fuehrung and the "citizen in uniform" "old
cliches," which had become worn out over time. The chancellor
then praised the army for transforming boys into men. Military
life had a positive effect on young draftees, which made the
Bundeswehr, in his view, "a school of the nation for the European
idea." This unintentional reference to "the school of the
nation," seemed to recall the anti-socialist, anti-catholic, and
anti-semitic political education of the Germany army of the
Empire. Although he later denied that he intended his comments to
do so, Kiesinger 's words seemed to signal that the opponents of
the "citizen in uniform" could now open fire on the reforms.
Quite independent on the chancellor's speech, the leadership
in the Ministry of Defense had begun to ponder the effects of
current political and social unrest upon the ideal of the
"citizen in uniform." Minister of Defense Gerhard Schroeder (CDU)
requested that the service chiefs provide draft comments on
possible revisions to the military reforms. While those from the
air force and navy staffs were short and uncontroversial , the
study prepared by the staff of Army Chief of Staff General Albert
Schnez was drastic indeed.
The authors of the study, while professing their adherence
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to the principles of the "citizen in uniform, " insisted that
Innere Fuehrung must be adapted to the present political and
social challenges to democracy in West Germany. In the eyes of
critics, however, the army leadership seemed intent on weakening
the reform spirit in detail. Much of the study contained specific
suggestions to enable the army better to fulfill its tasks on the
battlefield. Rather than highlighting the integration of the
soldier in a democratic state, the authors maintained that the
combat power of the army should be the chief concern. "This
assignment must be clear to every soldier. He is not there solely
to deter, but to fight in case deterrence fails. He can only
contribute to deterrence by achieving this fighting power.
Therefore, being a soldier is an assignment sui generis and not a
'profession like any other.'" Elsewhere the authors demanded
amendments to the military legislation of the 1950s that appeared
to weaken the rights of the "citizen in uniform" and increase the
authority of the officer corps over draftees. But the most
controversial passage in the document came in its conclusion,
where the authors seemed to hint that the leadership of the army
wanted to shake off civilian control and regenerate West German
society in its own image: "Every attempt to cure symptoms
promises as little effective success as the removal of individual
deficiencies. Only a reform that has the goal of going after the
illness at its roots, at the 'heads and limbs' of the Bundeswehr




The Schnez Study became the manifesto of the internal
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military challenge to the reforms that escalated in the months
from late 1969 to early 1971; in a certain sense the document
retained this role into the decade of the 1980s. The concern of
its authors with the combat power of the army within the highly
charged political environment of the time collided with a major
shift in West German politics. The study was published soon after
the fall of the CDU/SPD Grand Coalition government and the
arrival of Helmut Schmidt (SPD) as Minister of Defense in the
cabinet of Willy Brandt. Schmidt had long been a member of the
parliamentary defense committee and a reserve officer in the
Bundeswehr. Many Bundeswehr officers regarded him as the ideal
man to handle the job. He had to tackle the Innere Fuehrung
problem immediately after taking office; in the eyes of some
critics, anxious about a Socialist defense minister for the first
time since Gustav Noske, Schmidt faced a difficult assignment.
Nor did the advent of Brandt's Ostpolitik make Schmidt's task any
easier; the West German opening to the east tended to undermine
support for a high state of military readiness among draftees.
Nonetheless, Schmidt was effective in dampening the opposition to
the reforms. With the aid of Armed Forces Chief of Staff General
Ulrich de Maiziere and Brigadier General Eberhard Wagemann,
Schmidt heard out the complaints of the officer corps and
represented their interests before parliament. He described the
Schnez study as being in part "worthy of discussion and in need
of discussion," but he did not use the document as an excuse to
cashier its authors. He wisely avoided a confrontation with the
officer corps at the difficult moment in which the social-liberal
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coalition had to win the faith of the military. Grashey was
allowed to retire early, while Schmidt defended Schnez before the
public as having been given the task to comment critically on the
state of the army, which the report had done.
* * * *
The counter-reformation of the military leadership faded
quickly after its height in the early 1970s; the movement never
enjoyed political popularity outside the ranks and reflected the
painful attempt of a segment of the officer corps to come to
grips with the stormy changes in West German society and
politics. Schmidt carried out improvements in the military
personnel structure and educational system. Outstanding among
these reforms was the foundation of the two Bundeswehr
universities in 1972.
At roughly the same time, many of the leading military
critics of the "citizen in uniform" retired from the ranks. The
debate about Innere Fuehrung lost much of its vehemence as the
Bundeswehr increasingly came to be officered by men from the
"white years," that is officers too young to have served in the
Wehrmacht. These men had been exposed to the ideal of the
"citizen in uniform" continually from the time they joined the
ranks in 1956.
The era of open debate about the "citizen in uniform" was in
turn followed by what some observers have described as a
"technocratic phase" in the evolution of the Bundeswehr, wherein
the growing bureaucratization of military life--by no means a
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phenomenon unique to the West German army—became a subject of
controversy and debate. The cult of high technology and the
official enchantment with management techniques came to play an
ever greater role in the spirit of the armed forces. Perhaps this
trend was an unintended consequence of the open debate about the
purpose of soldierly existence that had preceded the 1970s.
Professional soldiers, unable openly to discuss the needs of
their profession in a pluralistic, technological society,
retreated ever more into a sterile world of flow charts and
computers. General Werner von Scheven, a leading officer
connected with Innere Fuehrung in the 1970s and 1980s, pointed to
the danger of this trend in numerous speeches and writings. He
spoke repeatedly of the need for society to accept the profession
of soldiering.
The return of the great power confrontation to Europe in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, however, renewed aspects of the old
debate about the "citizen in uniform." The debate in the very
recent past focused on the problem of the maintenance of military
tradition in the Bundeswehr. This issue, however, was really a
symptom of the political crisis surrounding the deployment of the
Intermediate Nuclear Missiles and the decline of the social-
liberal coalition of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. This latter
debate, outside the scope of this essay, revived many of the
questions about the soldier in the state advanced in earlier
decades; in fact, the questions of the 1950s about the loyalty of
the soldier to West German democracy had been answered.
The exchange of over three decades about the ideal of the
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"citizen in uniform" reveals how the West German military has
mirrored developments in the state and society that created the
new military. The founders of the Bundeswehr established the
force with the promise of reform, which they found difficult to
fulfill because of a variety of political, social, and indeed
psychological causes. Looking back in the mid-1980s, Baudissin
believed that the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" has failed to
live up to the original design. Grashey and those like him
dismissed Innere Fuehrung as nothing more than a political mask
and a hindrance to military efficiency. From the perspective of
one who has both served with the Bundeswehr and studied its
history from the sources, its seems fairly plain that though
Baudissin' s wishes of the 1950s may have gone unfulfilled, he is
overly pessimistic in his judgment, while Grashey and his
sympathizers are simply wrong. The reforms have been flawed in
detail and often the victim of political and social circumstance,
but despite its many problems, Innere Fuehrung has given the
Bundeswehr a quality of political, social, and intellectual
sophistication that the armed forces of countries with a longer
democratic tradition might well aspire to in their civil-military
relations
.
In their attempt to perfect the "citizen in uniform, " the
founders of the Bundeswehr sought honestly to come to grips with
the burden of German history while balancing the demands of
society with those of the soldier. The imperative to compromise
in formation of the self-image of the Bundeswehr led many critics
to assert that the Federal Republic missed its opportunity to
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create truly democratic soldiers in the 1950s; Adenauer should
have made no use of soldiers from the armies of the Empire, the
Reichswehr, or the Wehrmacht. But this kind of statement serves
more the needs of contemporary politics more than those of
scholarship. Many of the strongest advocates of military reform
were themselves veterans of the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht who
adapted to the changed political circumstances of West Germany in
the 1950s. The reforms fell victim to the political imperative to
create the army virtually overnight as well as to the inherent
problem of quickly altering traditional patterns of human
behavior and experience.
The changes in world politics, strategy, and technology; the
dictates of personnel; and the need to integrate the soldier into
society have all had their effect on the Bundeswehr from its
inception to the present. If one seeks to understand the spirit
of the Bundeswehr, one must begin with this insight or fail to
comprehend the institution as its members understand it. That the
Bundeswehr could have done better with its soldiers and the
fashioning of their self-image is probably true; that the
military has done much better than its predecessors in the
twentieth century seems fairly well substantiated by events. This
success of the Bundeswehr, when measured against the fears of the
1950s about a new military state with a state, should be measured
against the practical rather than the ideal. More than thirty
years of an army in a democracy integrated within an alliance has
substantiated the ideal of the "citizen in uniform" and should
today provide the Bundeswehr with its greatest military tradition
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